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“I know no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so 
effective as their stringent execution.”
1
 
 
*** 
 
“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad 
law.”
2
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine reported that as many as 98,000 
deaths were attributed to medical error nationally each year.
3
 In 2000, 
the health care industry in New Jersey ranked forty-eighth in patient 
care and safety.
4
 Considering these findings, the New Jersey Legislature 
enacted the Patient Safety Act (hereinafter the “Act”) in 2004 in order to 
improve patient care.
5
 With the central objective to assure that hospitals 
and health care facilities report certain serious preventable adverse 
events to government agencies,
6
 the statute provides a mechanism for 
hospitals to engage in a process of self-critical analysis through 
 
3 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM 
REPORT]. See also S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 5 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for 
S. 2105 as pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session). 
4 S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 5 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as 
pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session). While New Jersey ranked as the third-worst 
state with respect to patient safety in 2000, the cross-state ranking continued to drop. In 
2006, Health Grades ranked New Jersey last for hospital patient safety. See HEALTH 
GRADES, INC. THIRD ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/HealthGradesQualityStudy-75.pdf. 
In 2011, Health Grades determined that New Jersey ranked forty-ninth in risk adjusted 
bloodstream infection rates. See HEALTH GRADES, INC. EIGHTH ANNUAL PATIENT SAFETY IN 
AMERICAN HOSPITALS STUDY 3 (2011), available at 
https://www.cpmhealthgrades.com/CPM/assets/File/HealthGradesPatientSafetyInAmerican
HospitalsStudy2011.pdf. 
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(c) (West 2004). 
6 § 26:2H-12.25(a)-(e). 
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confidential, cross-disciplinary communication.
7
 The Act, which 
attempts to create a non-punitive approach to patient safety,
8
 generally 
protects the confidentiality of documents within its purview.
9
 Yet with 
the passage of the bill and its mandatory application, the degree to 
which the Act modifies the common-law approach is unclear.
10
 
This Note analyzes the evidentiary privilege afforded to self-
critical analysis in New Jersey. Specifically, this Note focuses on the 
degree to which the Patient Safety Act replaces the New Jersey courts’ 
grant of discovery rights to factual portions of materials and documents 
created as part of a process of self-critical analysis within the medical 
industry. Given New Jersey’s preference for broad discovery,
11
 New 
Jersey’s Patient Safety Act does not replace the common-law rule, 
which allowed discovery of factual portions of documents generated 
during self-critical analysis of adverse events. Part I of this Note will 
demonstrate the statute’s ambiguity as to the degree of discoverability 
these documents face and engage in an interpretative examination of the 
Act applying those factors dictated by the New Jersey judiciary. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the history of reporting adverse 
events in the United States and New Jersey, as well as the status of the 
self-critical analysis privilege in New Jersey prior to the Legislature’s 
adoption of the Patient Safety Act in 2004. Part III will discuss the 
enactment of the Patient Safety Act and its relationship to the New 
Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division’s decision in Christy v. 
Salem.
12
 Part IV will discuss how New Jersey courts have approached 
discovery of factual portions of self-critical reports created by health 
care professionals and institutions following the adoption of the Patient 
Safety Act. Part V will apply statutory interpretation to determine 
whether the Patient Safety Act bars discovery of factual portions of 
documents created as part of a process of self-critical analysis. 
 
7 § 26:2H-12.25(f)-(k). 
8 § 26:2H-12.24(c). 
9 See § 26:2H-12.25(f)-(k). 
10 See, e.g., Applegrad v. Bentolila, No. L-0908-08, 2011 WL 13700 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Jan. 11, 2011) [hereinafter “Applegrad I”]. 
11 See Christy v. Salem, 841 A.2d 937, 942 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (citing 
Kernan v. One Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 713 A.2d 411, 426 (N.J. 1998)). 
12 See Christy, 841 A.2d at 937. 
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II. SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE IN NEW JERSEY: 
AN OVERVIEW 
A. What is Self-Critical Analysis 
New Jersey courts,
13
 along with other jurisdictions,
14
 recognize a 
privilege of analysis contained in evaluative reports. The self-critical 
analysis privilege generally requires the following: (1) that the 
information sought resulted from self-critical analysis conducted by the 
party seeking to invoke the privilege; (2) that public policy encourage 
preservation of an atmosphere that promotes uninhibited flow of the 
information within the industry; and (3) that disclosure of such 
information would be detrimental to the free exchange of such 
information within the industry.
15
 New Jersey courts have recognized 
the privilege within a number of industries, including employment
16
 and 
health care.
17
 
B. The Rise of Self-Critical Analysis Procedures in New Jersey 
As the health care industry flourished in the mid-twentieth century, 
national medical associations sought to improve patient care through the 
application of uniform standards of care.
18
 These industry groups formed 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (“Joint 
Commission”) to promote hospital-based reform through an evaluative 
process of health care institutions.
19
 In 1965, hospitals seeking 
participation in the Medicare system could do so by meeting the Joint 
Commission’s accreditation criteria, thus solidifying its power as the 
leader in-patient care auditing.
20
 In 1979, the Joint Commission 
implemented an auditing system among its accredited hospitals 
requiring participants to organize systems of quality assurance.
21
 Under 
 
13 See, e.g., Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 691 A.2d 321, 332-33 (N.J. 1997). 
14 See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
15 See, e.g., Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). 
16 See Payton, 691 A.2d at 332-33. 
17 See Christy, 841 A.2d at 940-41. 
18 See Carl F. Ameringer, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY 
TO MARKET COMPETITION 190-95 (Berkeley, CA 2008). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Reyes v. Meadowlands Hosp. Med. Ctr., 809 A.2d 875, 876-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. 
Div. 2001). 
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its current criteria for accreditation, hospitals must perform self-critical 
assessments in the wake of certain events involving potential medical 
errors or unanticipated negative outcomes.
22
 
With the growth of the health care market and the promulgation of 
peer review policies for Joint Commission accredited hospitals, the New 
Jersey Legislature sought to mandate such a peer review policy for New 
Jersey hospitals. In 1999, the New Jersey Legislature enacted hospital 
licensing standards,
23
 which required, among other things, that hospitals 
conduct medical “peer review programs” as a condition of their 
licensure.
24
 In doing so, the Legislature required these programs to 
perform self-critical analysis of negative outcomes by evaluating patient 
care through ongoing monitoring.
25
 
C. Privileged: The New Jersey Courts Approach to Self-Critical 
Analysis 
In the wake of such accreditation requirements by the Joint 
Commission and the New Jersey Legislature, litigants began seeking 
materials associated with those peer review programs for use in medical 
malpractice suits. In Christy v. Salem, decided three months prior to the 
New Jersey Legislature’s adoption of the Patient Safety Act in April 
2004, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division treated facts in 
medical peer review reports separately from evaluative material.
26
 
Christy arose out of a medical negligence action brought by a 
plaintiff, Gilbert Christy, who became paralyzed during his course of 
treatment at the defendant-hospital. Christy was injured in a car accident 
and taken to Capital Health System at Fuld.
27
 After performing 
radiological studies on Christy, doctors prematurely removed his 
breathing tube resulting in his paralysis.
28
 Christy filed a complaint 
alleging malpractice.
29
 In the aftermath of his paralysis, the hospital’s 
internal “peer review committee” investigated the matter and generated 
 
22 Id. 
23 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-2.12(a) (2012). 
24 § 8:43G-27.1(d). 
25 § 8:43G-27.5. 
26 Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42. 
27 Id. at 938. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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a written report.
30
 During discovery, depositions of treating physicians 
resulted in conflicting testimony regarding the factual account of his 
care.
31
 In light of such discrepancies, the plaintiff sought a copy of that 
report.
32
 The hospital resisted, claiming that the report was privileged 
from disclosure as confidential, self-critical analysis.
33
 The trial court, 
after examining the report in camera, determined that it was not 
privileged, and that the report was discoverable in its entirety.
34
 
In a unanimous decision by the Appellate Division, the three-judge 
panel affirmed the trial court’s determination in part and reversed in 
part.
35
 Rather than granting blanket permission to discover all 
information contained within the report, the Appellate Division allowed 
facts to be discoverable while barring discovery of evaluative and 
opinionated portions of the report.
36
 The court further stipulated that 
those facts contained in documents falling within the rubric of self-
critical analysis were not barred from discovery when they were also 
contained in other non-privileged sources.
37
 
In his analysis, Judge Jack L. Lintner relied on precedent regarding 
the discoverability of documents created as part of a process of self-
critical analysis in other non-medical related industries.
38
 He pointed to 
the existence of the privilege under New Jersey common-law but noted 
that New Jersey courts are generally guarded in granting the privilege.
39
 
In Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
refused to “adopt the privilege of self-critical analysis as a full 
privilege.”
40
 Rather, the court viewed self-critical analysis as part of 
general confidentiality, the discoverability of which should be 
determined through the application of a balancing test.
41
 Thus, New 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Christy, 841 A.2d at 938-39. 
33 Id. at 939. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 940. 
37 Id. at 939-40. 
38 See Christy, 841 A.2d at 939-40. 
39 See id. at 939-41 (The court looked to the application of the self-critical analysis 
privilege in Payton, 691 A.2d 321 and McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991 
(N.J.1985).). 
40 Payton, 691 A.2d at 331. 
41 Id. 
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Jersey courts have established the privilege as a subclass of general 
confidentiality rather than making it grounds for categorical exclusion.
42
 
This approach was consistent with the character of New Jersey 
discovery rules, which prefer broad discovery to facilitate full 
disclosure of fact in order to promote settlement.
43
 
Since New Jersey courts recognized the importance of 
confidentiality with regards to self-critical analysis, the Payton court 
considered the value of confidentiality through a balancing test.
44
 The 
court found that “case-by-case” balancing of the party’s right to the 
information against the public interest in confidentiality would provide 
enough weight to self-critical analysis as to preclude disclosure.
45
 
However, the Payton court opined that most controversies should result 
in disclosure, as public policy arguments of the self-critical analysis 
privilege will not outweigh the benefits of discovery. 
Relying on precedent set forth in Payton, the Christy court found 
“competing interests” impressing upon the prospective disclosure of the 
confidential peer review report: 
On one hand, a patient has a legitimate interest in discovering 
“information concerning his care and treatment” which potentially 
could aid him “in prosecuting a personal injury malpractice suit.” On 
the other hand, a hospital’s “right to maintain the confidentiality of 
its peer review committee report embraces a public interest to 
improve the quality of care and help to ensure that inappropriate 
[medical] procedures, if found, are not used on future patients.”
46
 
To account for the countervailing interests, the court treated factual 
portions of the committee report differently than the evaluative 
portions.
47
 Specifically, the court held that the purely factual material 
 
42 Id. 
43 CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 468 (N.J. Super Ct. 
App. Div. 1992) (citing Werkheiser v, T.E. Warren, Inc. 361 A.2d 603, 604 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1976)). 
44 Payton, 691 A.2d at 331. See also McClain which applied a balancing test to 
determine the applicability of the privilege rather than recognizing the privilege in full. The 
court balanced the following criteria: 
the extent to which the information may be available from another source; 
the degree of harm that the litigant will suffer from its unavailability; 
the possible prejudice to the agency investigation. 
492 A.2d at 998-999. 
45 Payton, 691 A.2d at 331. 
46 Applegrad, 2011WL13700, at *5 (quoting Christy, 841 A.2d at 940). 
47 See Christy, 841 A.2d at 941. 
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outlined in the relevant section of the report was discoverable while 
opinions, analyses, and findings of fact concerning the events that are 
the subject of the plaintiff’s case were protected from disclosure.
48
 In 
distinguishing between factual and evaluative aspects of a hospital’s 
self-assessment materials, the court observed that the availability of 
factual information from other sources does not necessarily preclude 
disclosure of facts contained in the materials in question.
49
 
The court further required that the plaintiff seeking discovery of 
such deliberative materials show a compelling need for disclosure.
50
 The 
resulting decision ultimately valued a patient’s right to know to a 
greater extent than the societal benefits of hospitals conducting fully 
confidential self-critical evaluations. 
As a result, Christy established three important holdings regarding 
the discoverability of materials claimed to be protected under the self-
critical analysis theory: (1) courts are to conduct a balancing test of the 
competing policy interests when determining the discovery of 
information contained within self-evaluative reports;
51
 (2) when 
balancing the countervailing implications, discovery of factual 
information appears appropriate in the context of medical malpractice 
litigations;
52
 (3) the mere result that factual information contained within 
these reports is also found in other sources does not bar discovery of 
those facts from the “privileged” materials.
53
 
III.  THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT 
A. Why A Bill Was Introduced: Mandatory Reporting 
While New Jersey common-law separates fact from opinion, the 
balancing test only applies to material that was prepared for mandatory 
government reports or reports created as part of self-critical analysis.
54
 
The New Jersey Legislature codified this privilege for the health care 
 
48 Id. at 941-43. 
49 Id. at 941-42. 
50 Id. at 942. 
51 Id. at 940 (citing Payton, 691 A.2d at 333). 
52 Id. at 942. 
53 Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42. 
54 Kopacz v. Del. River and Bay Auth., 225 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D.N.J. 2004) (citing 
Melhorn v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98–CV–6687, 2001 WL 516108, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2001)). 
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industry with adoption of the Patient Safety Act.
55
 
Prior to its enactment, however, the New Jersey Legislature 
gradually regulated the health care industry’s approach to patient care. 
In 1970, the Legislature limited the disclosure of information secured by 
utilization review committees of certified hospitals except to physicians, 
hospital administrators, insurance carriers, or representatives of related 
government agencies.
56
 In another statute predating the Patient Safety 
Act, the Legislature protected hospital peer-review committees 
responsible for reviewing a physician’s credentials from civil liability.
57
 
However, the statute did not codify any privilege pertaining to 
information created during that process.
58
 
In 1999, the New Jersey Department of Health and Human 
Services (“Department”), which the Legislature vested authority to 
license hospitals within the state,
59
  codified its most significant 
provision affecting the management of patient care by hospitals. As part 
of the state’s current licensing process, the Department requires 
hospitals to implement a “hospital-wide continuous quality 
improvement program” in order to “monitor[] patient care.”
60
 These 
programs command hospitals to appoint a quality improvement 
committee with the purpose of reviewing and assessing “risk 
management activities” in order to improve overall patient care.
61
 Yet 
despite these inroads in patient care, New Jersey was the only state that 
did not statutorily protect the discovery of materials created by peer 
review committees by 1999.
62
 
B. The Patient Safety Act’s March through the Legislature 
Since the implementation of N.J.A.C. § 8:43G-27.1, the 
Legislature has sought to create mandatory reporting of adverse events 
by hospitals to state agencies while limiting the discoverability of 
 
55 See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:2H-12.23 – 12.25 (West 2004). 
56 § 2A: 84A-22.8. For an explanation of utilization review committees see Todd v. So. 
Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152 F.R.D. 676, 682 (D.N.J. 1993), which describes such committees as 
hospital entities responsible for implementation of utilization review plans required for 
participation under the Social Security Act. 
57 § 2A:84A-22.10. 
58 See § 2A:84A-22.10. 
59 See § 26:2H-1 et seq. 
60 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 8:43G-27.1(b) (20012). 
61 § 8:43G-27.1(d)-(e). 
62 IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 1999. 
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documents created in connection with hospital’s compliance.
63
 In 2002, 
Democratic Senator John Girgenti
64
 first introduced a version of the 
Patient Safety Act in order to “allow health care facilities to continue to 
engage in open and frank discussion without fear of self-
incrimination.”
65
 This version sought to codify the self-critical analysis 
privilege by barring discovery or admissibility of any “self-critical 
analysis.”
66
 The bill specifically pronounced “all facts related to the 
adverse event would continue to be available through the normal 
discovery process.”
67
 The bill remained stagnant after being referred to 
the Senate Health, Human Services and Senior Citizens Committee.
68
 
On January 13, 2004, a redrafted version of the Patient Safety Act 
was introduced to the Senate.
69
 Comparable to the 2002 bill, the 2004 
version (hereafter “S. 557”) embodied the basic principle of limiting 
discovery of materials produced in connection with health care quality 
control committees. However, the primary role of the bill was the 
creation of a mandatory reporting requirement for hospitals that 
 
63 See, e.g., S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002). 
64 Senator Girgenti served twelve years in the New Jersey General Assembly before 
entering the Senate in 1990. From 1990 until 2012, he represented the 35th Legislative 
District comprising townships in southeastern Passaic County, New Jersey. See Senator 
John A. Girgenti’s New Jersey Senate Democrats biography available at 
http://njsendems.com/senator.asp?sid=35. 
65 S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002). Note that an identical version of S. 2105, numbered 
A. 2658, was introduced in the Assembly. See S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (Main bill 
information available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2002-
2003” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for 
“S2105”).). 
66 The bill defined self-critical analysis as “confidential, critical, evaluative or 
deliberative reports, opinions or materials prepared by a healthcare facility and its staff in 
connection with a medical error.” Additionally, S. 2105 proposed the following materials to 
be not considered privileged: “information obtained by observation, sampling, examining, 
auditory or monitoring by any regulatory agency; information obtained from a source 
independent of the self-critical analysis review; and information exchanged by and among 
the department and other appropriate regulatory agencies pursuant to an agreement between 
or among those agencies.” S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002). 
67 S. 2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002). 
68 The bill was reintroduced to the Senate in January 2004 as S. 527, however the bill 
again did not move beyond the committee phase. See S.2105, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (Main 
bill information available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 
2002-2003” hyperlink; then follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for 
“S2105”).) and  S. 527, 211th  Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S527”).). 
69 S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004). 
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experienced an “adverse event.”
70
 In so doing, the bill’s sponsors 
proposed the bill to “encourage disclosure of these events so that they 
can be analyzed and used for improvement.”
71
 The bill required health 
care facilities to report adverse events to the Department.
72
 Additionally, 
the bill barred discovery of any document, material or information 
created for the Department pursuant to reporting requirements.
73
 
Subsection (g) of the bill provided that “any documents, materials or 
information developed by a health care facility [in connection with 
reporting adverse events to the Department] shall not be subject to 
discovery or admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, 
criminal or administrative action.”
74
 Subsection (h) ensured that 
information present in these documents would not bar “availability, 
admissibility, or use. . . if obtained from any source or context other 
than those specified.”
75
 Thus, the mere fact that a statement was present 
in a document created pursuant to this proposed Act would not bar its 
discoverability if contained in a document that was otherwise 
discoverable. 
S. 557 was referred to the Senate Health, Human Services and 
Senior Citizens Committee, which approved the bill without change.
76
 In 
a statement to the Senate, the Senate Committee noted that limitations 
on discovery “shall not be construed to affect, in any way, the 
availability, admissibility or use of any such documents, materials or 
information if obtained from any source or context other than those 
specified.”
77
 On February 23, 2004, the Senate passed the bill by 
 
70 As introduced, the bill defined an “‘adverse event’ as an event that is a negative 
consequence of care that results in unintended injury or illness, which may or may not have 
been preventable.” S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). 
71 S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. Additionally, Subsection (g) disallowed the “documents, material or information” 
from being used in “an adverse employment action or in evaluation of decisions made in 
relation to accreditation, certification, credentialing or licensing of an individual” or 
“considered a public record” under the state’s sunshine laws. Id. 
75 S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as introduced on Jan. 13, 2004). 
76 See S. 527, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).) and S. 557, 211th 
Leg. (N.J. 2004) (as Senate Committee Substitute on Jan. 26, 2004). 
77 S. 2015, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as pre-
filed for introduction in the 2002 session). 
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unanimous vote and the Assembly subsequently received the bill.
78
 In 
the Assembly Health and Human Services Committee (“Assembly 
Committee”), legislators attempted to address the Appellate Division’s 
holding in Christy v. Salem decided on February 17, 2004. The 
Assembly Committee amended the bill by including the word 
“discoverability” to Subsection (h).
79
 Additionally, the Assembly 
Committee added the following language to the bill: “Nothing in the 
substitute is to be construed to increase or decrease the discoverability, 
in accordance with Christy v. Salem of any documents, materials or 
information if obtained from any source or context other than those 
specified in this substitute.”
80
 The Assembly unanimously passed the 
bill.
81
 On March 29, 2004, S. 557 passed the Senate by a unanimous vote 
and was subsequently entered as public law upon approval by then-
Governor Jim McGreevey.
82
 
C. The Legislative Findings of the Patient Safety Act 
As enacted, the Patient Safety Act seeks to improve patient safety 
through a goal of “craft[ing] a health care delivery system that 
minimizes. . . the harm to patients that result from the delivery system 
itself.”
83
 To encourage compliance, the Legislature codified in its 
findings the importance of open dialogue even at the expense of limited 
liability: 
[I]t is critical to create a non-punitive culture that focuses on 
improving processes rather than assigning blame. Health care 
facilities and professionals must be held accountable for serious 
preventable adverse events; however, punitive environments are not 
particularly effective in promoting accountability and increasing 
 
78 See S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).). 
79 ASSEMBLY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMM. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR S. 557, S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). 
80 Id. Furthermore, the Statement accompanying the Assembly Committee’s amended 
version of the bill merely quotes the amended language from the bill regarding Christy 
without providing any additional insight into the meaning or intent of the included language. 
See id. 
81 See S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).). 
82 Id. 
83 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.24(c) (West 2004). 
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patient safety, and may be a deterrent to the exchange of information 
required to reduce the opportunity for errors to occur in the complex 
system of care delivery. Fear of sanctions induces health care 
professionals and organizations to be silent about adverse events, 
resulting in serious under-reporting[.]
84
 
Thus, the Legislature believed that in order to ensure compliance and 
truthful reporting to the government agency, hospitals had to be 
protected from such materials resulting in self-incriminating 
consequences. 
IV. NEW JERSEY COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACH TO SELF-
CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
While the Patient Safety Act took effect on October 24, 2004,
85
 
litigants in medical malpractice suits continued to rely on the bifurcated 
standard set forth in Christy.
86
 Despite the Patient Safety Act’s effect on 
discoverability of peer review documents, New Jersey courts tended to 
gloss over the issue in subsequent years. 
A. Kowalski v. Palav
87
 
In a 2010 decision, the Appellate Division briefly addressed the 
trial court’s management of a “Criterion Report”
88
 prepared by the 
Hospital’s Quality Assurance Committee during the discovery process 
and trial.
89
 The trial court granted the plaintiff access to the report during 
discovery but ultimately disallowed its introduction as evidence during 
trial.
90
 Regarding the trial court’s decision requiring the hospital to 
 
84 § 26:2H-12.24(e). 
85 § 26:2H-12.23 (West 2004). See also Patient Safety Act, ch. 9, 2004 N.J. Laws 
(approved April 27, 2004). 
86 See, e.g., Brief for Defendants, Manalio v. Summit Hosp., No. UNN-L-3300-04, 
2005 WL 5921141 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 14, 2005). 
87 Kowalski v. Palav, No. L-4433-99, 2010 WL 4107751 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Aug. 25, 2010). 
88 According to the court, the report was a one-paragraph document that briefly stated 
the events surrounding the distressed birth of the plaintiff. Id. at *16. 
89 Id. at *15-20. 
90 Id. at *15-17. During interrogatories, defendant physician was asked whether the 
hospital or any staff prepared any notes concerning the adverse event. The defendant 
responded “No.” During trial Plaintiff’s counsel served a notice to produce any such 
documents. The defendant hospital produced the report in question. Subsequently, the trial 
court allowed plaintiffs to use the document to challenge defendant physician’s credibility. 
However, the judge denied defendant’s request to “read the content of the report for the 
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produce the report, the appellate court upheld the ruling: 
Unlike the internal investigative report we considered in Christy. . . 
the Criterion Report does not contain the results of any deliberative 
process undertaken by the quality assurance committee. Rather, it 
briefly states the facts of the case and then notes that the attending 
physician recommended it for discussion from an educational 
perspective. This report is not the type warranting privilege under 
N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.25(k).
91
 
The court’s decision regarding the discoverability of the Criterion 
Report in Kowalski appears to contradict the statutory language and the 
Legislature’s codified intent for enacting the statute. As previously 
noted, subsection (3)(k) of the Patient Safety Act arguably intends for 
the statute not to disturb the Christy court’s holding regarding the 
discoverability of parallel information if it is contained in both the 
documents created in connection with the mandatory reporting system 
as well as other sources not listed in the statute.
92
 Furthermore, the 
statute was specifically enacted to shift the punitive approach to 
improving patient care to a non-punitive focus.
93
 
B. Applegrad v. Bentolila I:
94
 The Dilemma 
The extent to which the Act affected the Christy holding did not 
appear before the Appellate Division until Applegrad v. Bentolila I.
95
 In 
this medical malpractice action arising out of injuries sustained during 
the minor plaintiff’s birth,
96
 the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s 
interlocutory rulings sustaining the assertion of privilege as to thirteen 
pages of internal hospital records that were withheld during discovery. 
The records were withheld on the basis that they were fully protected 
from disclosure under the Patient Safety Act as well as under other 
statutes, regulations, and case law.
97
 During discovery, plaintiffs sought 
defendant hospital’s production of documents surrounding the adverse 
 
record. . . [because] ‘the results of these meetings are not admissible under the law.’” Id. at 
*15-16. 
91 Id. at *20. 
92 See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. 
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(a)-(e) (West 2004). 
94 See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700. 
95 Id. at *1. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at *1-2. 
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event in question.
98
 The hospital withheld certain quality assurance 
reports, claiming its discovery was barred under the self-critical analysis 
theory.
99
 
The panel remanded the matter to the trial court, finding the record 
to be inadequate concerning the specific genesis of each document.
100
 
After the plaintiffs moved to compel the production of the documents, 
the motion judge performed an in camera review of the reports.
101
 As 
part of its review, the trial court applied the Christy standard and 
subsequently redacted certain opinionated portions.
102
 However, prior to 
releasing the documents to the plaintiff, the defendant’s counsel 
submitted an ex parte brief claiming, for the first time, that the Patient 
Safety Act protected the reports in total.
103
 Subsequent to this ex parte 
communication, the motion judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion.
104
 In so 
doing, the judge relied on the following reasoning: 
(1) the legislative policies underlying the [Patient Safety Act] 
encourage hospitals to perform confidential internal self-critical 
analyses after adverse events occur; (2) the one document that [the 
judge] otherwise would have released in redacted form to plaintiff’s 
counsel under Christy. . . constituted ‘a quality assurance report’ 
fully protected from disclosure by the [Patient Safety Act]; (3) 
plaintiffs had not sufficiently proven a need for disclosure, as 
reflected by their ability to settle with [one defendant] without seeing 
the documents at issue; and (4) the judge’s perception that the factual 
information on the quality assurance report otherwise could have 
been obtained by plaintiffs through discovery.
105
 
The Appellate Division ultimately left the issue of discoverability 
undecided, instead holding that when a trial court reviews documents in 
camera it must “make specific determinations regarding [the] plaintiff’s 
access to them.”
106
 Furthermore, the court, in remanding the action, 
required the trial judge to examine each document and iterate, as to each 
 
98 Id. at *2. 
99 Id. 
100 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *1. Plaintiffs allege that the employees of 
defendant hospital failed to sufficiently monitor the labor and delivery process resulting in 
their daughter experiencing oxygen deprivation culminating in brain damage. 
101 Id. at *2. 
102 Id. at *2-3. 
103 Id. at *3. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (footnote omitted) 
106 Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *10. 
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document, whether the privilege was applicable and explain its rationale 
for ruling so.
107
 
Despite the court’s holding, it chose to “present an overview” of 
the divergent views of interpreting the meaning of the Patient Safety 
Act in light of its legal significance.
108
 Following a comprehensive 
dissertation of the Christy decision and the applicable contents of the 
Patient Safety Act, the court detailed two interpretations of the Patient 
Safety Act particularly in light of the inclusion of subsection (3)(k).
109
 
The first, as advocated by the hospital defendant, advocates a narrow 
construction of subsection (k), “arguing that the factual/evaluative 
distinction adopted in Christy is not applicable to documents that are not 
generated within a hospital pursuant to the [Patient Safety Act].”
110
 The 
opposing viewpoint promotes an interpretation as to the statute’s 
reference to Christy, preserving its applicability and other legal 
authority “predating the [Patient Safety Act] to the extent they permitted 
full or partial disclosure of certain internal hospital self-assessments.”
111
 
Such a reading contends that the “factual/evaluative distinction still 
applies to documents generated under the [Patient Safety Act] if the 
information is also contained in other discoverable sources that 
preexisted the PSA.”
112
 While the court chose not to resolve the 
interpretive issues, its holding imposed a procedural hurdle upon 
providers seeking a privilege under the Patient Safety Act.
113
 By 
requiring providers to certify as to the origins of documents and their 
relation to the Patient Safety Act, hospitals must explain why materials 
are privileged; this forces trial judges to dictate detailed findings.
114
 
 
107 To expedite the remand process, the court directed the hospital to furnish the trial 
court within thirty days with detailed certification, to address each document’s origin, 
purpose, generation process, and relation to patient care. Id.at *11. 
108 Id. at *4. 
109 Id. at *8. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Abbot S. Brown, Hospital Malpractice: Finding the Needle in the Haystack, 204 
N.J.Law Journal 545 (May 30, 2011). 
114 Id. 
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C. Muenken v. Toner
115
 
While the judiciary refused to resolve the issue in Applegrad I, the 
Appellate Division continued its trend to shorten the Patient Safety 
Act’s limitations on discovery. In Muenken v. Toner, the court 
concluded that factual portions of a peer review committee’s report 
were discoverable.
116
 In doing so, the court applied the balancing test 
dictated in Christy,
117
 reaffirming the underlying rationale for treating 
factual portions differently than evaluative portions with respect to the 
self-critical analysis privilege: 
The privilege is not all-encompassing. It applies to limited portions 
of self-critical evaluations and reports, specifically those evaluative, 
deliberative non-factual portions that would have a chilling effect on 
doctors taking steps to improve their procedures. Furthermore, as in 
Christy [], the balancing approach has not resulted in a systematic 
barring of deliberative and evaluative material that unfairly prevents 
parties from obtaining truthful information.
118
 
While a trial court is obligated to follow the precedent dictated in Toner 
and consequently apply the Christy balancing test, the underlying issue 
remains unresolved. In its per curiam opinion, the Toner court did not 
refer to the Patient Safety Act.
119
 By failing to address the statute, the 
decision fails to definitively resolve the issue addressed by the 
Applegrad I court. 
D. Applegrad v. Bentolila (II):
120
 A New Standard 
Although New Jersey courts continued to recognize the Christy 
standard, no court had engaged in any statutory analysis to resolve the 
question until the issue in the Applegrad I matter reemerged ripe for 
review.
121
 The court examined the interplay between the qualified 
privilege enumerated in Christy and the dimensions of confidentiality 
proscribed by the Patient Safety Act through the lens of statutory 
 
115 Muenken v. Toner, No. L-591-06, 2011 WL 2694431 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 
13, 2011). 
116 Id. at *9. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at *1-9. 
120 Applegrad v. Bentolila, 51 A.3d 119 (N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 2012) [hereinafter 
“Applegrad II”]. 
121 Id. at 123. 
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interpretation.
122
 The court held “that post-event investigatory and 
analytic documents exclusively created in compliance with the [Patient 
Safety Act] and its associated regulations, and not created for some 
statutory or licensure purpose, are absolutely privileged from disclosure 
under the [Patient Safety Act].”
123
 In so doing, the court iterated a new 
standard that grants an absolute privilege to documents falling within 
the purview of the Patient Safety Act unless the procedural 
requirements of the Act were not observed or if the documents were 
generated for non-Act purposes. In such instances, the common-law 
standards – such as those developed in Christy – govern.
124
 
The court reasoned that the Act’s purpose – “to create a non-
punitive culture that focuses on improving processes rather than 
assigning blame” – could not be furthered if the Legislature intended 
plaintiffs to access factual portions of documents created for the sole 
purpose of the new reporting requirement.
125
 Furthermore, the court 
deferred to the Department’s position that the Act protected information 
exclusively developed during the process of self-critical analysis.
126
 
Despite its ultimate holding, the court branded the statute’s 
reference to Christy as “an eleventh-hour attempt by legislators to deal 
with brand-new case law.”
127
 Furthermore, the court forewarned health-
law professionals: 
Another important caveat to bear in mind is that our construction of 
the PSA is not an invitation to health care providers to shield 
information that was previously accessible under Christy or under 
other law by indiscriminately labeling such formerly accessible items 
as “PSA material.” Nor does the law allow a health care facility to 
evade the limitations of N.J.S.A. 26:2H–12.25(h) and (k) by giving 
job titles to hospital personnel such as “PSA officers” when, in fact, 
they are performing functions that are not truly covered by the 
PSA.
128
 
Through this caveat, the court cautions health care facilities against 
pretextual posturing. 
While the Applegrad II court appears to resolve the ambiguity of 
 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at124 (quoting § 26:2H-12.25(g)). 
126 Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 139-40. 
127 Id. at 138. 
128 Id. at 140-41. 
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the Patient Safety Act, the court notes that the issue is still unresolved 
despite its holding.
129
 On remand from Applegrad I, proponents for a 
continuance of the Christy standard contended that the provision at 
issue was unconstitutional under the laws of New Jersey.
130
 The New 
Jersey Constitution affords the New Jersey Supreme Court  absolute 
dominion over the judiciary’s procedural rules, while evidentiary rules 
are adopted only through the participation of all three branches of 
government.
131
 The court in Applegrad II left the constitutional issue 
unresolved: 
Given this backdrop of constitutional and legal history, we decline to 
pronounce the confidentiality provisions in the PSA an invalid 
exercise of legislative power. Moreover, we agree with the trial 
judge that the ultimate assessment of this constitutional question is 
best reserved to the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the 
boundaries among our three branches of State government.
132
 
V. APPLICATION OF NEW JERSEY COMMON-LAW ANALYSIS 
Understandably, the reference to Christy in subsection (3)(k) has 
caused considerable consternation for courts, as evinced by the 
divergent holdings in Muenken and Applegrad II.
133
 Discovery of factual 
information contained within reports created for the Department or 
documents generated to fashion such reports has considerable policy 
implications. Currently, the Appellate Division’s application of the 
Patient Safety Act in light of the first two parts of Christy remains 
discordant.
134
 While some appellate courts recognize the Christy 
standard in full, the court in Applegrad II resolved the question in favor 
of granting a broader privilege, with limited exceptions, rather than 
continued application of the Christy standard. 
 
 
129 See id. at 145-46. 
130 Id. at 129. 
131 Id. at 145. 
132 Applegrad II, 51 A.3d at 146 (internal citation omitted). 
133 See, e.g., Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700. 
134 See supra Part II.C. for a discussion of the three holdings dictated in Christy v. 
Salem. 
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A. Process of Statutory Interpretation as Dictated by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court 
New Jersey’s general rules of statutory construction require “words 
and phrases [to] be read and construed with their context, and [requires 
that they] shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, 
be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved 
usage of the language.”
135
 The New Jersey Supreme Court recently 
dictated the appropriate method for engaging in textual interpretation of 
a statute.
136
 The primary duty of the interpreting court is to “construe and 
apply the statute as enacted,” and in doing so recognize that “[t]he 
Legislature’s intent is the paramount goal.”
137
 First, it is necessary to 
determine whether the statute is “‘clear and unambiguous, and 
susceptible to only one interpretation’. . . [or] if there is ambiguity that 
leads to more than one plausible interpretation.”
138
 It is clear, given 
judicial recognition in Applegrad I, that competing readings of the 
Patient Safety Act’s reference to Christy are at least plausible.
139
 
Second, any reading of the statute should presume words bear their 
ordinary meaning and have the same meaning throughout a document.
140
 
Any ambiguous statutory language requires an examination of the 
“extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history, committee reports, 
and contemporaneous construction.’”
141
 
B. Does the Act Codify an Absolute Bar on Discovery of 
Materials Created under the Statute? 
As recognized in Applegrad I, one reading of the Patient Safety 
Act bars the factual/evaluative distinction adopted by Christy as to 
documents generated by a hospital pursuant to the statute.
142
 Any 
 
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1. (West 2004). 
136 See DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1048-57 (N.J. 2005). 
137 Id. at 1048. (citing In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 416 A.2d 896, 900 (N.J. 
1980) and Frugis v. Bracigliano, 827 A.2d 1040, 1057-58 (N.J. 2003)). 
138 Id. (quoting Lazano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 842 A.2d 156, 161 (N.J. 2004)). 
139 See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. 
140 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1048 (citing Lane v. Holderman, 129 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 
1954)). 
141 Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 861 A.2d 123, 129 
(N.J. 2004)). 
142 See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. 
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argument that the Patient Safety Act codifies a complete bar of 
discoverability of documents created within the purview of the statute 
would rely heavily on the language of the statute. The Act dictates that 
“documents, materials or information” received by the Department 
required by a process of reporting,
143
 or otherwise developed as part of a 
process of self-critical analysis, “shall not be subject to discovery 
admissible as evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil, criminal or 
administrative proceeding.”
144
 Subsection (h) places an exception to the 
general rule: “the provisions of this [A]ct shall not be construed to 
increase or decrease, in any way, the availability, discoverability, 
admissibility or use of any such documents, materials or information if 
obtained from any source or context other than those specified in the 
[A]ct.”
145
 
An analysis of the language in the statute could support the 
contention that the statute places an absolute bar on discovery of 
documents and other materials within its scope. The statute as written 
appears to begin with the premise that the self-critical analysis reports 
are fully protected from discovery and that the statute itself merely adds 
two important caveats.
146
 The first, as stated in subsection (h), seeks to 
limit the statute from affecting sources independent from those 
specifically enumerated in the Act.
147
 The second, as stated in subsection 
(k), provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed to affect the 
discoverability of such sources “in accordance with Christy[,] if 
obtained from any source or context other than those specified.”
148
 The 
canon of statutory construction, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius – 
 
143 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25(f) (West 2004). 
144 § 26:2H-12.25(g). Note that the enumerated materials of this subsection and 
subsection (f) are barred from use in adverse employment actions or “evaluation of 
decisions made in relation to accreditation, certification, credentialing or licensing of an 
individual, which is based on the individual’s participation in the development, collection, 
reporting or storage of information in accordance with this section.”§ 26:2H-12.25(f)(2), 
(g)(2). 
145 § 26:2H-12.25(h). 
146 See §§ 26:2H-12.24(e), 12.25(f)-(k). 
147 § 26:2H-12.25(h). For any party seeking production of facts contained within 
evaluative reports, an important argument would be that the documents are not those 
specifically listed. Thus, not only is the information outside the scope of the Act, but also 
subsection (h) ensures that the Act in no way affects their discoverability. For example, if 
the document was not developed by a healthcare facility as part of a process of self-critical 
analysis or for a patient or patient’s family, then the Act would not affect its discoverability. 
148 § 26:2H-12.25(k). 
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expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another left 
unmentioned – sheds some light on the interpretative analysis.”
149
 Such 
an interpretation would dictate that the Legislature’s specific inclusion 
of the third part of the Christy holding, without mention of the other 
parts, implies that the factual/evaluative standard is excluded. 
Not only does a reading of the statute support such an 
interpretation, but an examination of the pertinent legislative history 
also promotes a narrow reading of the statute. In 2002, S. 2015 sought 
to codify the self-critical analysis privilege with respect to the health 
care industry, but in so doing clearly allowed “all facts related to the 
adverse event. . . to be available through the normal discovery 
process.”
150
 Arguably, by not including this language in the 2004 version 
of the bill, the Legislature intentionally sought to remove such a caveat 
to the privilege. In fact, the Legislature made no mention of the 
factual/evaluative distinction in any draft after 2002 or in any statement 
accompanying such drafts.
151
 Furthermore, S. 2105 was reintroduced to 
the Senate Committee, as S. 527, on the same day that S. 557 was 
introduced to the same committee. While “an affirmative expression 
ordinarily implies a negation of any other,”
152
 there was no implied 
exclusion, but rather an explicit acceptance of S. 557 at the expense of 
S. 527, which had codified the factual/evaluative distinction.
153
 Such a 
reading would ensure that the Christy caveat would not act as a long 
arm able to reach into these specific documents and reports simply 
because the information may be found elsewhere. 
 
 
149 Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 853 A.2d 940, 946 (N.J. 2004) (citing Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabel, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 514 A.2d 
832, 835 (N.J. 1986). See also, In re Vince, 67 A.2d 141, 147 (N.J. 1949) (“Where the 
policy and purpose of the statute indicate that the common-law was intended to be 
superseded, and the working of the statute is so complete that it reasonably appears to be 
exclusive, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius may be said to be applicable.”). 
Alternatively, the canon is referred to as inclusio unius est exclusion alterius. 
150 S. 2015, 210th Leg., at 6 (N.J. 2002) (statement to New Jersey Senate for S. 2105 as 
pre-filed for introduction in the 2002 session). 
151 See S. 527,211th Leg. (N.J. 2004) (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S557”).) and S.527, 211th 
Leg. (N.J. 2004 (Main bill information available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (follow “Bills 2004-2005” hyperlink; then 
follow “Bill Number” hyperlink; then search “Bill Number” for “S527”).). 
152 Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 810 (N.J. 1947). 
153 See sources cited supra note 76. 
SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:36 PM 
2012] THE PATIENT SAFETY ACT AND DISCOVERY RULES 229 
In support of this reading, it should be noted that a shift has 
occurred since New Jersey courts first examined the self-critical 
analysis privilege. In refusing to support an absolute privilege, the 
Payton court dictated that recognized privileges “are rooted in our 
jurisprudential traditions and reflect a firm societal commitment to 
preserving particular confidences even at the expense of truth.”
154
 
However, the Payton court further iterated the importance of the self-
critical analysis privilege in theory: 
Valuable criticism can neither be sought nor obtained nor generated 
in the shadow of potential or even possible public disclosure. It is not 
realistic to expect candid expressions of opinion or suggestions as to 
future policy or procedures in an air of apprehension that such 
statements may well be used against one’s colleague or employer in 
a subsequent litigated matter. The purpose of an investigation 
intended to seek criticism. . .of then existing policy or procedure is 
self-improvement. The value of the investigation is questionable if 
the input is not reliable. It is clear that the reliability of the input in 
this situation varies inversely with the risk of disclosure of the input 
or resulting criticisms.
155
 
Such language mirrors the Legislature’s concerns codified in the Patient 
Safety Act.
156
 
Additionally, the court performed its analysis of the privilege 
within the context of a wrongful termination lawsuit.
157
 As the 
Legislature noted in its findings, the implication of recognizing the 
privilege is to create an open forum for the health care industry to 
improve patient care by reducing “the harm to patients that results from 
the delivery” of care.
158
 
C. Reasons Why the Patient Safety Act Should be Read to Uphold 
Christy v. Salem 
The implication of an absolute bar of factual information contained 
within those sources specifically referenced by the Patient Safety Act 
would be drastic, and as such, New Jersey courts should continue to 
 
154 Payton, 691 A.2d at 331. 
155 Id. (quoting Wylie, 478 A.2d at 1277). 
156 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.24(e) (West 2004). 
157 See Payton, 691 A.2d at 324. 
158 ASSEMBLY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. COMM., STATEMENT TO SENATE COMM. 
SUBSTITUTE FOR S. 557, S. 557, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004). 
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follow Christy in light of significant public policy considerations. 
Although courts are barred from “writ[ing] an additional 
qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted in drafting its own 
enactment,”
159
 lower courts have continued to apply the holding in 
Christy notwithstanding the statutory language with some success.
160
 
While such a construction may appear at odds with the legislative 
intent, a more critical examination of the statute supports these courts’ 
application of Christy. 
New Jersey courts recognize that “the Legislature is presumed to 
be aware of judicial construction of its enactments,”
161
 and that “a 
change of language in a statute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration 
in [the] substance of the law.”
162
 By those canons of statutory 
construction, courts will presume that the Legislature was aware of the 
Christy decision and that the Legislature consciously included 
subsection (k) in addition to subsection (h) as another condition to the 
limitation on discoverability of self-critical analysis. As the New Jersey 
Supreme Court bluntly stated, “we hardly need state that the Legislature 
knows how to incorporate into a new statute a standard articulated in a 
prior opinion of this Court.”
163
 Consequently, “statutory language ‘must 
not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or 
meaningless.’”
164
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This principle of statutory interpretation requires two separate 
provisions, which serve as caveats to the general limitation of 
discoverability, be included and given unique applications. Under such 
a standard, the Legislature’s specific reference to Christy in subsection 
(k) could therefore not merely be a reaffirmation of subsection (h). The 
alternative reading would render subsection (k) a redundant addition 
that serves as nothing but a superfluous footnote. As such, subsection 
(k) must preserve the applicability of Christy to the extent that courts 
permit the application of the factual/evaluative distinction to documents 
generated under the Patient Safety Act if the information is also 
contained in other discoverable sources.
165
 
Beyond the redundancy that would result in reading subsection (k) 
merely to reaffirm subsection (h), such a result would have 
contemporaneous adverse consequences. This interpretation would limit 
litigants in medical malpractice suits from confirming factual 
information purported by opposing parties.
166
 
Ultimately, “the search for truth is paramount in the litigation 
process.”
167
 The importance of full disclosure of all relevant facts is 
“designed to insure that the outcome of litigation in [New Jersey] shall 
depend on its merits in light of all of the available facts, rather than on 
the craftiness of the parties or the guile of their counsel.”
168
 Furthermore, 
the court in Christy recognized the essential role that granting litigants 
access to these reports would play with respect to the search for truth: 
Oftentimes the comparison of different sources reveals 
inconsistencies that aid in the search for truth. This is especially true 
here, where plaintiff asserts discrepancies in the factual deposition 
testimony of various doctors. It is not unusual to find subtle 
 
165 See Applegrad I, 2011 WL 13700, at *8. If such interpretation were applied, litigants 
seeking production of documents falling within the purview of subsection (f) or (g) would 
merely have to show that the purely factual information is contained in other sources but 
need not have those sources to demonstrate such a connection. For example, if a litigant 
sought specific factual information pertaining to the position of a fetus prior to the 
performance of a caesarean section, the litigant could simply ask the performing physician 
in an interrogatory and/or subsequently request the production of factual portions of the 
physician’s letter to the quality assurance board. 
166 See Christy, 841 A.2d at 941-42. 
167 Id. at 942 (citing Kernan, 713 A.2d at 426). See also Hipp v. Prudential Cas. & Sur. 
Co. of St. Louis, 244 N.W. 346, 348 (S.D. 1932) (citing Curtis v. Michaelson 219 N.W. 49, 
52 (Iowa 1928) (“A statute intended for public benefit is to be taken most strongly against 
those who claim rights or powers under it and most favorably to the public.”). 
168 Lang v. Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp., 78 A.2d 705, 707 (N.J. 1951). 
SARDINA NOTE FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  1:36 PM 
232 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1 
differences in both testimony and documented facts, which support 
an argument bearing on credibility.
169
 
A narrow reading of the Patient Safety Act would constructively bar 
significant procedural opportunities typically afforded to litigants. By 
barring discovery of factual portions of these documents, litigants 
would be forced to rely on hospitals’ strict record keeping and the 
testimony of physicians, who typically serve as defendants in the 
context of medical malpractice suits. Typically, statutes with procedural 
implications are “given a construction, if possible, which will preserve 
the essentials of harmony in the judicial system, and the established 
practice should not be changed except by the clearly expressed will of 
the lawmakers.”
170
 Undoubtedly, absent such a protection, a significant 
possibility arises: defendant physicians could perjure themselves with 
full knowledge that the only record of their indiscretion is contained 
within their privileged reports. 
Furthermore, the Christy court previously addressed any argument 
that such a decision would not undercut compliance with reporting: 
We are not convinced that hospital peer review committees will 
intentionally leave out purely factual information, which otherwise 
would provide the basis for their deliberative findings and opinions, 
simply because it is discoverable. The purely factual material 
outlined in the first paragraph of Fuld’s report is discoverable.
171
 
Additionally, it is likely that committees will continue to engage in a 
process of self-critical analysis of adverse events since other statutes 
already limit liability against such actors.
172
 Furthermore, while failure to 
report does not impose specific sanctions under the statute, failure to do 
so could result in some form of administrative sanction.
173
 Thus, not only 
does statutory construction support continued application of the Christy 
holding, but public policy considerations strongly encourage disclosure 
of factual information in malpractice litigations irrespective of the 
sources in which the fact is contained. 
 
169 Christy, 841 A.2d. at 941-42. 
170 In re Kuser’s Estate, 26 A.2d 688, 698 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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332. 
173 James G. Sheehan and Michael A, Morse, 2007 Health L. Handbook § 6:31. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
With the enactment of the Patient Safety Act in 2004, the effect 
upon the discovery of facts contained within self-evaluative reports 
created by health care institutions in connection with a medical error 
remains in flux. While proponents of continued disclosure argue that the 
Act merely codified such a right to litigants as dictated by the judicial 
system in Christy v. Salem, opponents of such a construction contend 
that the Act bars discovery of any information contained within self-
critical reports created as an effort to comply with reporting 
requirements. A narrow interpretation of the statute supports such a 
contention in light of the Legislature’s purposes for enacting the statute. 
However, given the ambiguous actions of the Legislature, as well as 
countervailing public policy considerations, New Jersey Courts should 
continue to grant access to purely factual information contained within 
these reports. Alternatively, the New Jersey Legislature should amend 
the statute (following the proper procedural requirements for imposing 
new evidentiary rules) to articulate its intended effect. 
 
